Embedded Files
Helpful prior knowledge and learning objectives
Helpful prior knowledge and learning objectives
Helpful prior learning:
Section 1.1.1 The economy and you, which explains what an economy is and how it is relevant to students’ lives
Section 1.1.2 The embedded economy, which explains the relationship between the economy and society and Earth’s systems
Section 1.3.9 Power in the economy, which explains where power comes from and how it shapes economic relationships
Section 3.2.1 Capitalism: definition and development, which explains what capitalism is and how it developed
Section 3.2.4 Market power, which discusses what market power is, how businesses gain more market power and its various social and ecological consequences
Section 5.2.4 Globalisation and loss of state sovereignty, which discusses how globalisation and loss of state sovereignty threaten the state’s ability to meet human needs within planetary boundaries
Section 6.3.7 National strategies: Central bank digital currencies, which discusses functions and potential risks of a central bank digital currency (CBDC)
Section 7.1.1 Global exchange as a system, which describes global exchange as a system with parts, relationships, functions and emergence
Section 7.1.2 History of global exchanges, which describes how global exchange systems have evolved over time, shaped by changes in technology, power, and environmental factors
Section 7.1.3 What moves across borders? which describes what flows across borders and explains how visible global flows are linked to less visible social and ecological effects
Section 7.2.1 Why do countries trade and restrict trade? which describes different forms of protectionism and explains arguments for and against freer trade
Section 7.2.2 Currency exchange, which explains what exchange rates are, identifies the factors that cause them to change, and analyses who gains and who loses when exchange rates move
Section S.1 What are systems?, which explains what a system is, the importance of systems boundaries, the difference between open and closed systems, and the importance of systems thinking
Section S.2 Systems thinking patterns, which outlines the core components of systems thinking: distinctions (thing/other), systems (part/whole), relationships (action/reaction), and perspectives (point/view)
Section S.5 Causal loops, feedback and tipping points, which explains the feedback loops that can stabilise or destabilise systems
Learning objectives:
explain how the global economy has created concentration chokepoints in critical minerals, technology, digital infrastructure, and financial systems
explain how physical and concentration chokepoints together amplify systemic risk and reinforce existing inequalities between countries
On 3 April 2024, a 7.4 magnitude earthquake struck Taiwan. Technology companies around the world watched the situation anxiously. The reason was one factory complex on the island's west coast. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) makes around 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductor chips. Every smartphone, laptop, electric vehicle, and AI system depends on them. A single earthquake on one island threatened the supply of components that global technologies run on.
The physical chokepoints discussed in Section 7.3.4 are bottlenecks in the route something must travel through like a maritime strait, a canal, or a cable. The concentration chokepoints discussed in this section are related to who controls the supply of something critical to the economy.
Figure 1. Taiwanese company TSMC makes about 90% of all the most advanced computer semiconductor chips in the world.
(Credit: Robert, licensed from Adobe Stock)
What are the main concentration chokepoints in global exchange today?
What are the main concentration chokepoints in global exchange today?
Concentration chokepoints show up in several parts of the global economy. They appear in the minerals that power new technologies. They appear in the machines and expertise behind advanced manufacturing. They appear in the digital infrastructure that runs everyday services. They appear in the systems that move money across borders.
These chokepoints form in different ways. Sometimes a resource like a mineral exists in only a few places, so whoever controls that ground controls the supply. Sometimes a state invests in an industry for decades until it comes to dominate one stage of production. Sometimes a technology is so difficult to develop that only one company manages it, even after competitors try for years.
Sometimes ordinary market competition produces the same concentration chokepoints. Companies grow larger and more efficient, outcompeting others until only a few remain. They reinforce their advantage through economies of scale (Section 3.2.4), network effects (Section S.7), and reinforcing feedback loops of wealth and power (Section S.5).
However concentration forms, it is hard to reverse once it exists.
Critical minerals
Critical minerals
Modern digital technologies depend on a small number of specific minerals: lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements. They are essential components in smartphones, laptops, and batteries of all kinds. Demand for them is rising fast as the world shifts toward AI, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar panels.
Sources and extraction of specific minerals are often highly concentrated in just one or two countries. The Democratic Republic of the Congo produces more than 70% of the world's cobalt and also has the largest cobalt reserves, the amount still in the ground and not yet extracted (Figure 2). China produces close to 80% of the world's natural graphite. A handful of countries, led by China and Australia, account for most of the world's mined rare earths.
Figure 2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has the largest cobalt reserves in the world, and is currently also the largest producer of the critical mineral.
(Credit: Hannah Ritchie, using data from USGS)
Refining minerals is an even larger chokepoint than mining. Ore that comes out of the ground cannot be used directly in a semiconductor chip, battery, or a motor. It must first go through complex industrial processes to purify it and convert it into usable materials. China controls around 91% of the world's refining capacity for rare earth elements, around 70% of battery-grade lithium and cobalt processing, and around 90% of graphite refining. This means China dominates the processing stage even for minerals it does not mine much of itself. Cobalt mined in the DRC and lithium mined in Australia both typically need to be sent to China to be refined.
Countries use control over concentrated resources as political leverage when it serves their interests. In late 2024 China restricted exports of several minerals essential for semiconductor production to the United States, and added further materials to these restrictions in 2025. The United States has used control of other chokepoints to exercise power of its own, as you will see later in this section.
Semiconductor technologies
Semiconductor technologies
The Taiwan earthquake described at the start of this section threatened the world's chip supply because Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) makes around 90% of the world's most advanced chips. This concentration exists because chip manufacturing at the most advanced level requires expertise built up over decades. No other company has matched it, despite years of trying.
There is a second, less visible technology chokepoint behind TSMC. To make the most advanced semiconductor chips, every manufacturer in the world needs an extreme ultraviolet lithography system. These machines use pulses of light to etch microscopic patterns onto silicon wafers. The newest, most advanced machines cost up to US$400 million and take years to build. Only one company makes them, ASML, based in the Netherlands (Figure 3). No other company has been able to develop this technology despite decades of trying.
Figure 3. An extreme ultraviolet lithography machine from Dutch company ASML
(Credit: ASML)
Both chokepoints face risks beyond natural disasters. China considers Taiwan part of its territory and has stated its intention to bring it under its control, by force if necessary. Chinese military exercises have repeatedly rehearsed isolating the island. A conflict over Taiwan would directly threaten the supply of chips that the world's technology, medical, and defence systems depend on. It would also cut off ASML's machines from the world's chip supply at the same moment, because TSMC and a handful of other fabs are what turn ASML's technology into finished chips. This would give China enormous leverage over other countries that depend on Taiwanese manufacturing.
Digital platforms and services
Digital platforms and services
Most organisations today store their data and run their systems using remote computer networks owned by private companies. This is called cloud computing. Three American companies (Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud) hold around 63% of the global cloud market. Their share of the European market is even higher, at over 70%, and combined with other American cloud providers the share rises to 85%. European companies hold under 15% (Figure 4).
This means that hospitals, governments, courts, and universities around the world depend on US companies for systems that keep them running. Under a US law called the CLOUD Act, American authorities can demand access to data held by US companies anywhere in the world. Microsoft admitted in the French Senate in 2025 that it could not guarantee that European data would remain protected.
Figure 4. U.S. cloud proviers dominate European market, with share rising in recent years
(Credit: Synergy Research Group, via CNBC)
This dependency on US tech companies has already affected international institutions. In 2025, US sanctions on an official at the International Criminal Court cut off that person's Microsoft email account. The Court later moved its systems to European open-source software to avoid such pressures in the future.
In the short run, it is difficult to break free of US technology firms. However, Europe has the political and economic weight and legal frameworks to begin responding to this dependency. Most countries in the Global South depend on the same US tech company platforms, but have less capacity to negotiate data protections or build alternatives.
Financial infrastructure
Financial infrastructure
Global financial transactions depend on an invisible infrastructure. SWIFT is the messaging network that connects around 11,000 financial institutions in over 200 countries. It allows money to move between them. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, several Russian banks were excluded from SWIFT. Russia's ability to conduct international financial transactions collapsed almost overnight.
Visa and Mastercard process around $24 trillion in transactions annually. They handle 61% of eurozone card payments. When they suspended operations in Russia in March 2022, cross-border payments stopped functioning almost immediately for Russian citizens and firms. The decisions of these two private companies about who can use their systems are shaped by commercial interests, US law, and geopolitical pressure.
Figure 5. Visa and MasterCard dominate global international payment systems.
(Credit: Anton Pentegov, licensed from Adobe Stock)
For many countries in the Global South, this financial dependency goes even deeper. Much of international trade is priced and settled in US dollars (Section 7.3.6). This means that payments between two non-American countries often have to pass through banks controlled by the United States before they are completed. This allows the United States to monitor, delay, or block transactions between two other countries, even when no American company is involved.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has described Europe's dependence on non-European payment systems as a risk. It is developing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) to create payment infrastructure under European public control. For more on central bank digital currencies, see Section 6.3.7.
What happens when chokepoints occur together?
What happens when chokepoints occur together?
Each of these chokepoints is significant on its own. Together they create a more serious problem.
When chokepoints are separate, a disruption in one system can be managed using others. If shipping is disrupted, goods can be flown in. If one payment system fails, another can be used. But when several chokepoints fail at the same time, and for the same reason, those alternatives disappear.
Physical and concentration chokepoints interact with each other. The 2026 Hormuz closure disrupted oil and gas supply. It also cut fertiliser exports from Gulf chemical plants, halted subsea cable repairs in the Red Sea, and disrupted air freight through Dubai that carries medicines from Indian manufacturers. One geopolitical event sent shocks through energy, food, digital, and pharmaceutical supply chains at the same time. This happened because all of them run through the same geographic corridors and the same concentrated production systems.
Concentration chokepoints make recovery harder. A country trying to manage an energy shock cannot easily switch to renewable energy alternatives if China controls the processing of the minerals those technologies require. A state trying to respond to a crisis cannot act freely if its digital systems depend on foreign servers and its international payments run through foreign-owned networks.
Shocks also move faster through connected systems. Rising energy prices push up fertiliser costs. Higher fertiliser costs push up food prices. Higher food prices can lead to political instability. Each step makes the next one worse.
Countries that depend on multiple chokepoints they do not control feel this most severely, but no country is immune. Wealthier countries can draw on reserves of money, food, or other resources to soften the impact and buy time during a shock. Or they can pay more to secure alternative suppliers. But money cannot conjure a rare earth refinery or a new chip factory in the short term, so even wealthy countries face real shortages and delays when a chokepoint fails. Countries with fewer resources have fewer of these options, so they are usually significantly more vulnerable to disruption. When chokepoints fail together, the heaviest costs still fall on those who were already most exposed.
Activity 7.3.5
Activity 7.3.5
Concept: Systems, Power
Skills: Thinking skills (transfer)
Time: varies, depending on option
Type: Individual, pairs, or small group
Option 1: Phosphorous case study
Time: 25-30 minutes
Phosphorus is one of the essential nutrients that plants need to grow. Along with nitrogen and potassium, it is a core ingredient in fertiliser. Without enough phosphorus, crop yields fall sharply. There is no substitute for it.
Phosphorus fertiliser comes from phosphate rock, a mineral that is mined from the ground. Phosphate rock is not evenly distributed around the world. Morocco holds nearly 70% of the world's known phosphate rock reserves. This is by far the largest share held by any single country. Most of the rest is concentrated in a small number of other countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, China, and Russia. Most countries have very little phosphate rock of their own.
China extracts almost half of the world's phosphate rock each year, more than any other country. But China processes almost all of it domestically and exports very little, keeping supplies for its own farms. Morocco, by contrast, exports heavily. The Moroccan state company OCP accounts for more than a third of all phosphate rock exported worldwide. This is why Morocco, not China, is the country the rest of the world depends on most, even though China mines more.
Some of Morocco's phosphate comes from Bou Craa, a mine located in Western Sahara. Western Sahara is a territory whose political status is disputed. Morocco administers most of it, but the United Nations has never recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the territory. The Polisario Front, representing the Sahrawi people, disputes Moroccan control. This dispute is unresolved.
Morocco's dominance is not only about geography. Producing phosphate fertiliser creates phosphogypsum, a toxic by-product, at a rate of five tonnes for every tonne of fertiliser made. Some countries, including the United States, are required to store this waste on land, which is costly. Other countries, including Morocco, can dispose of it at sea, which is cheaper.
Figure 6. Location of Bou Craa in Western Sahara (red location icon).
(Credit: Google maps)
Figure 7. Satellite image of the Bou Craa phosphate mine in Western Sahara
(Credit: NASA, via Wikimedia Commons, public domain)
Because of this concentration, the European Union has officially classified phosphate rock as a critical raw material. This means it is both essential to the economy and at high risk of supply disruption. Countries and researchers are responding in different ways.
Some are investing in recycling. Germany will require phosphorus to be recovered from sewage sludge from 2029 onward. A Paris development project is testing toilets that separate urine, which is then processed into fertiliser. Animal bones are another overlooked source. The EU discards more than 4 million tonnes of them each year, containing enough phosphorus to cover roughly a third of the EU's total demand, though this source is barely used so far.
Others are trying to build alternative supply. Saudi Arabia is investing heavily in its own phosphate industry. It aims to become the world's third-largest producer by 2040, behind only China and Morocco. In 2024, China restricted its own phosphate fertiliser exports to protect domestic supply. This disrupted supply chains for African countries that import fertiliser. It pushed several African countries to look for other suppliers, to reduce their exposure to any single source.
A different kind of response focuses on demand rather than supply. Since a large share of phosphorus is used to grow crops and feed for livestock, some researchers argue that plant-based diets could reduce overall demand for fertiliser. Plant-based diets need less land and fewer crops overall. Farming methods that use organic sources of nutrients instead of mineral fertiliser could reduce demand further.
These efforts are still small compared to the scale of global demand. Most countries with little phosphate rock of their own remain heavily dependent on imports from few sources.
Questions to consider:
Using the ideas from Section 7.3.5, explain why phosphate rock is a concentration chokepoint.
Which mechanism from Section 7.3.5's introduction (geography, state policy, technical barrier, or market competition) best explains why phosphate rock is so concentrated in Morocco? Explain your reasoning.
A country with very little phosphate rock of its own depends on imports to keep growing food. Using the reasoning from this section, explain what would make it difficult for that country to quickly reduce this dependence.
Phosphate rock from Western Sahara adds a layer of risk to this chokepoint beyond simple geographic concentration. In one or two sentences, explain what that additional layer is.
This case study describes two different kinds of response to the phosphorus chokepoint: increasing or diversifying supply (mining, refining, recycling) and reducing demand (diets, farming methods). Using the reasoning from this section, explain why a demand-side response might be harder to achieve quickly than it first appears, even though it does not depend on any single country's reserves.
Click on the arrow to see sample answers, but give it a go yourself first!
A concentration chokepoint is a case where control over something critical rests with very few countries or companies. Phosphorus is ‘essential’ because there is no substitute for it in growing food. A country cannot simply choose a different fertiliser input if phosphate rock becomes unavailable. Combined with the fact that supply is concentrated in few countries, this makes phosphate rock a clear example of a concentration chokepoint.
Geography is the main factor. Phosphate rock deposits exist naturally in only a few places on Earth, and Morocco happens to sit on the largest share of them. But geography is not the only factor. Environmental regulation also plays a role. Producers who face lower costs for handling waste, like Morocco, have an advantage over producers who face stricter and more expensive rules, like the United States. This shows that even a chokepoint that starts with geography can be reinforced by other factors over time.
A country with very little phosphate rock cannot create reserves that do not exist within its own territory. Even with money and time, it cannot mine phosphate rock it does not have. This makes the country's dependence on imports a long-term feature of its situation. It is not something that can be quickly changed through investment, unlike a chokepoint based on refining capacity or technical expertise, which could at least in principle be built domestically over time.
The additional layer is political and legal risk. Because Western Sahara's status is disputed and unresolved, some of the phosphate rock entering global supply comes from a source whose ownership and legal status other countries and organisations disagree about. This adds a risk connected to the unresolved dispute itself, on top of the risk that comes from the resource being geographically concentrated.
Demand-side responses do not depend on any single country's reserves, which makes them attractive in theory. But they require large numbers of individual people and farms to change established habits and practices, such as diets or farming methods, across many countries at once. This kind of change tends to happen slowly, and no single state or company can simply order it to happen the way it might invest in a mine or a recycling plant. This makes demand-side responses potentially powerful over the long term, but hard to rely on for a quick reduction in dependence.
Option 2: Responding to a refining chokepoint
Time: 20–25 minutes
Country X manufactures wind turbines. Wind turbines need rare earth magnets, and one country refines 91% of the world's rare earth elements. That country has just restricted exports of rare earth elements to Country X. Country X now has to decide how to respond.
Here are four possible responses:
Pay a much higher price to buy from an alternative refiner, if one exists
Draw down a stockpile, if the country has one, to buy time
Invest in building domestic refining capacity
Do nothing, and accept shortages, delays, and higher costs for the wind turbine industry
Questions to consider:
For each response, explain what would make it difficult for Country X to carry out. Use the section's explanation of why concentration is hard to reverse to support your answer.
Rank the four responses from fastest and most accessible to slowest and most demanding.
Explain how a situation like this could amplify risk and deepen inequality between countries, using the ideas from the final part of this section.
Click on the arrow to reveal sample answers, but give it a go yourself first!
Paying a higher price for an alternative refiner depends on an alternative existing at meaningful scale, which may not be true given how concentrated refining already is. Drawing down a stockpile only works if a stockpile already exists, and it only buys time rather than solving the problem. Investing in domestic refining is the most difficult, because the section explains that the knowledge, equipment, and supply networks needed to refine rare earths have built up in one place over many years. Country X would need to build all of this from very little, which takes years and significant investment. Doing nothing avoids cost but means accepting real damage to the wind turbine industry.
A reasonable ranking, fastest to slowest: paying a higher price for an alternative supplier (if one exists) is fastest, since it uses existing infrastructure. Drawing down a stockpile is also fast, but only works for a limited time. Doing nothing is immediate but not really a solution. Building domestic refining capacity is by far the slowest, since it requires new expertise, equipment, and supply networks that do not yet exist.
A situation like this concentrates risk on countries that already have the fewest options. Wealthier countries can soften the impact by paying more or drawing on reserves, even if they cannot escape it entirely. Countries with fewer resources have none of these options, so they lose access for longer and pay a higher relative cost. This matches the section's point that convergence and concentration chokepoints do not affect all countries equally. They fall hardest on countries that were already most exposed, deepening existing inequalities rather than distributing the impact evenly.
Option 3: Is your country discussing digital platform sovereignty?
Time: 30 minutes
This section explained that most of the world depends on a small number of American companies for cloud computing and digital infrastructure. Some states have started taking steps to reduce this dependence. This is sometimes called ‘digital sovereignty.’ In this activity, you will find out whether the country where you live, or one that you have a close connection to, is having this conversation.
Step 1: Search
Use search terms like these, in English or your own language:
‘[country] digital sovereignty’
‘[country] government cloud data protection’
‘[country] reduce dependence technology companies’
Look for news articles, government statements, or reports from research organisations. Avoid opinion blogs or forum posts, since these are less reliable.
Step 2: Answer these questions
Does the country's government or public sector use cloud services from US companies, such as Amazon, Microsoft, or Google? If you cannot find a direct answer, what evidence suggests they might?
Has the government, or any public institution such as a hospital, university, or court, taken steps to move away from foreign-owned digital infrastructure? Describe what you found.
If you found no evidence of action or discussion, what might that suggest about the country's exposure to this chokepoint?
Step 3: Reflect
In two or three sentences, using the reasoning from this section, explain whether you think the country would find it easy or difficult to become less dependent on foreign cloud providers quickly. Use what you learned about why concentration chokepoints are hard to reverse. Share your ideas with another student or a small group.
Ideas for longer activities and projects are listed in Subtopic 7.5
Checking for understanding
Checking for understanding
Coming soon!
Further exploration
Further exploration
AI's Single Point of Failure - A TED talk explaining how nearly all of the world's most advanced AI chips are made in a single Taiwanese facility, and what a conflict over Taiwan could mean for the global AI industry. Difficulty level: easy
The mineral grab: will low-carbon technology be controlled by a few countries? - An article using official mining data to show, mineral by mineral, which countries hold the largest reserves and production of the materials needed for solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. Difficulty level: medium
Inside ASML, the wildly successful company that every advanced chipmaker relies on - A video report giving an exclusive inside look at how ASML's extreme ultraviolet lithography machines are made, the only machines in the world capable of printing the most advanced computer chips. Difficulty level: easy
Sources
Sources
African Development Bank. (2025, November). Phosphate: Critical mineral insights [Factsheet]. https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/phosphate_factsheet_final_nov_21.pdf
Anlauf, A. (2024, November 12). Phosphorus: Extractivist agriculture. Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Soil Atlas 2024. https://eu.boell.org/en/SoilAtlas-Phosphorus
Clark, Lindsay. (2026, February 18). Microsoft throws spox under the bus in ICC email flap. The Register. https://www.theregister.com/2026/02/18/microsoft_asks_uk_parliament_to_correct_record/
Clark, L. (2025, July 25). Microsoft exec admits it 'cannot guarantee' data sovereignty. The Register. https://www.theregister.com/2025/07/25/microsoft_admits_it_cannot_guarantee/
Dash, S. (2026, March 20). Chokepoints and chains. Foreign Policy in Focus. https://fpif.org/chokepoints-and-chains/
European Sustainable Phosphorus Platform. (n.d.). Phosphate rock in EU Critical Raw Materials list. https://www.phosphorusplatform.eu/scope-in-print/news/359-phosphate-rock-in-eu-critical-raw-materials-list
Kim, T.-Y., Dhir, S., Dasgupta, A., & Scanziani, A. (2025, October 23). With new export controls on critical minerals, supply concentration risks become reality. International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/commentaries/with-new-export-controls-on-critical-minerals-supply-concentration-risks-become-reality
Klein, A. (2024, February 13). Payment systems' changing role from economic growth to the new foreign policy lever. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/payment-systems-changing-role-from-economic-growth-to-the-new-foreign-policy-lever/
Loohuis, Kim. (2025, December 22). Europe gets serious about cutting US digital umbilical cord. The Register. https://www.theregister.com/2025/12/22/europe_gets_serious_about_cutting/
Nicol-Schwarz, Kai. (2026, February 18). ‘A matter of national survival’: European governments on how they’re accelerating digital sovereignty as geopolitical tensions ramp up. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/18/europe-digital-sovereignty-geopolitical-tensions.html
Martin, Matthew. (2025, November 10). Exclusive: Saudi earmarks $15B to triple phosphate production. Semafor. https://www.semafor.com/article/11/10/2025/saudi-earmarks-15b-to-triple-phosphate-production
Parsons, Tim. (2022, March 2). What you need to know about SWIFT and economic sanctions. Johns Hopkins Hub. https://hub.jhu.edu/2022/03/02/understanding-swift-economic-sanctions/
Rzad, Madeleine. (2026, January 9). Market concentration of rare earth elements: China's dominance and the global response. Michigan Journal of Economics. https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2026/01/09/market-concentration-of-rare-earth-elements-chinas-dominance-and-the-global-response/
Synergy Research Group. (2026, July 30). Q2 cloud market passes $143 billion; highest growth rate in eight years [Press release]. https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/q2-cloud-market-passes-143-billion-highest-growth-rate-in-eight-years
Tarasov, K. (2022, March 23). ASML is the only company making the $200 million machines needed to print every advanced microchip. Here's an inside look. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/23/inside-asml-the-company-advanced-chipmakers-use-for-euv-lithography.html
Telarico, Fabio Ashtar. (2026, March 25). Geoeconomic credit risk: Europe's payment sovereignty and the wallet chokepoint. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geoeconomic-credit-risk-europes-payment-sovereignty-and-the-wallet-chokepoint/
Tridgell, J. (2025, November 20). Justice recoded? Why it matters that the International Criminal Court embraced open-source software and ditched Microsoft. EJIL: Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/justice-recoded-why-it-matters-that-the-international-criminal-court-embraced-open-source-software-and-ditched-microsoft/
Verdi, G. (2025, December 10). Get over your X: A European plan to escape American technology. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/get-over-your-x-a-european-plan-to-escape-american-technology/
Western Sahara Resource Watch. (2021). P for plunder 2021: Morocco's exports of phosphates from occupied Western Sahara. https://vest-sahara.s3.amazonaws.com/wsrw/feature-images/File/157/6081d8e0f3bcb_Pforplunder2021_Web.pdf
Wirtschafter, J., Malhotra, R., & Chen, Y. (2025, December 17). Strategic redundancy in semiconductor supply chains: How US-India cooperation transforms global chip resilience. The SAIS Review of International Affairs. https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/strategic-redundancy-in-semiconductor-supply-chains-how-us-india-cooperation-transforms-global-chip-resilience/
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Terminology
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