Embedded Files
Helpful prior knowledge and learning objectives
Helpful prior knowledge and learning objectives
Helpful prior learning:
Section 1.1.1 The economy and you, which explains what an economy is and how it is relevant to students’ lives
Section 1.1.2 The embedded economy, which explains the relationship between the economy and society and Earth’s systems
Section 1.1.4 Regenerative economies, which explains how circular, distributive and caring, needs-based and sufficient economies can meet human needs within planetary boundaries
Section 1.3.9 Power in the economy, which explains where power comes from and how it shapes economic relationships
Section 6.3.8 Global strategies: Redesigning global tools, which discusses how global financial tools are being redesigned to support regenerative social and ecological goals
Section 6.3.9 Global strategies: Redesigning global financial rules, which how global financial rules are being redesigned to support regenerative social and ecological goals.
Section 7.1.1 Global exchange as a system, which describes global exchange as a system with parts, relationships, functions and emergence
Section 7.1.2 History of global exchanges, which describes how global exchange systems have evolved over time, shaped by changes in technology, power, and environmental factors
Section 7.1.3 What moves across borders? which describes what flows across borders and explains how visible global flows are linked to less visible social and ecological effects
Section 7.2.5 Who writes the rules of global exchange? which explain who shapes the rules of global exchange and how various sources of power influence which rules are written and whose interests they reflect
Section 7.3.7 Financial flows and debt crises, which explains foreign-currency debt vulnerability, illicit financial flows, and power in debt restructuring
Section S.1 What are systems?, which explains what a system is, the importance of systems boundaries, the difference between open and closed systems, and the importance of systems thinking
Section S.2 Systems thinking patterns, which outlines the core components of systems thinking: distinctions (thing/other), systems (part/whole), relationships (action/reaction), and perspectives (point/view)
Section S.4 Stocks and flows, which explains how inflows and outflows affect stocks of things, leading to behaviour-over-time patterns
Learning objectives:
describe the different alternatives Global South countries have built to existing global financial institutions, across tax governance, development finance, and debt
discuss the extent to which these alternatives shift real power away from existing institutions
In 2021, after years of negotiation, 136 countries agreed through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to set a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15%. The aim was to stop large multinational corporations (MNCs) from shifting profits to low-tax countries to avoid paying tax where they actually operate. The global minimum meant MNCs would have the same rate everywhere.
This is important because taxes are an important source of revenue for most countries. When MNCs avoid tax, states have less money for schools, hospitals, infrastructure, and other public investment that regenerative economies need. It is also important to prevent excessive wealth accumulation that corrupts political systems and the media landscape (Section S.9).
In June 2025, the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed that US MNCs would be exempt from the rules. The US had threatened to raise taxes on other countries' companies and investors operating in the US, if its MNCs were subject to the new rules. The OECD formalised the US exception shortly after.
Figure 1. The G7 countries agreed to exempt US multinational corporations from a global minimum tax rate of 15%.
This is one example of a wider pattern. Decisions in global institutions often serve the interests of the most powerful countries. It is partly in response to this pattern that Global South countries have long been working on building alternative institutions and rules. They aim for a financial system where their governments have an equal say in setting the rules. In economic terms, they are working towards multipolarity, a system in which no single country or group of wealthy countries controls the rules that everyone else must follow.
Who writes the rules of global tax, debt, and finance now?
Who writes the rules of global tax, debt, and finance now?
An earlier section of this book explained how the rules of global exchange get made (Section 7.2.5). The same pattern holds here too. A small number of institutions design the rules, and Global North countries have the largest say in how those institutions operate:
The OECD sets international tax standards. Its 38 members are mostly wealthy countries. Countries outside the OECD have no seat at the table when its tax rules are drawn up, even though those rules apply to them too.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides emergency loans to countries in financial crisis, often with conditions attached that require cuts to public spending and privatisation of public assets.
The World Bank provides loans and grants for long-term development projects, such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare. Its loans can carry similar conditions to those of the IMF.
Voting shares in the IMF and World Bank remain weighted toward the Global North. These shares determine how much say each country has over loan approvals, lending conditions, and leadership appointments. Major IMF decisions require support from 85% of voting shares. This gives any country holding just over 15% an effective veto. The United States alone holds this much, so it can block major IMF decisions on its own. The BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) holds roughly 15% of IMF voting shares but represents over 40% of the world's population and nearly a third of global gross domestic product (GDP). The Vulnerable 20, the group of countries most exposed to climate and debt risk, holds 4% of voting shares but 16.6% of the world's population.
This imbalance shapes what gets funded, whose financial crises get prioritised, and what conditions borrowing countries must accept. In response to this imbalance, some countries pushed for a system where every country has an equal vote in setting the rules. In November 2023, the UN General Assembly voted 125 to 48 to start negotiating the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNFCITC), built on this principle. If countries agree on the treaty, it would move tax rule-making from the OECD to the UN, where countries have an equal say. Proposals for the convention include making hidden profits visible. Country-by-country reporting would require multinational corporations to publish the profit and tax they report in each country. Public beneficial ownership registers would show who really owns a company. Both target the transfer mispricing and tax havens described in Section 7.3.7.
Figure 2. Moving more financial rule-making authority to the United Nations would give every country an equal vote.
(Credit: United Nations)
Most Global North countries, including European Union (EU) members, voted against starting these negotiations in the UN. The United States may even try to block the treaty. Even if the treaty is agreed, an equal vote in the UN would not force any country to follow it. The UN has no enforcement power to make countries keep to agreements they oppose.
What are countries in the Global South building instead?
What are countries in the Global South building instead?
Across taxation, development finance, and debt, Global South countries with little voting power in the existing global system are designing alternatives outside it.
Alternatives in tax governance
Alternatives in tax governance
The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) has developed model tax treaties that work differently from the OECD standard. OECD tax treaties are based on the residence principle: profits are taxed where a company has its headquarters, usually in the Global North. ATAF's treaties are based on the source principle instead. They give the taxing right to the country where the economic activity actually happens, on the grounds that this is the country providing the workforce, infrastructure, and market that made the profit possible. This would mean more tax revenue for lower-income countries where large multinationals operate. The UNFCITC aims for a similar goal, working through the UN system instead.
Countries have also proposed new rules on personal wealth. Without international coordination, states face pressure to compete with each other by offering billionaires low tax rates. Coordinating a minimum rate removes this pressure. In 2024, Brazil held the presidency of the G20, the group of the world's 20 largest economies, and used this position to push for a coordinated global minimum tax on billionaires. G20 leaders meeting in Rio de Janeiro backed the idea, the first time the group had made this kind of commitment. The agreement is not legally binding. Each state decides for itself whether to act on it. Under the proposal, anyone with wealth above one billion US dollars would pay at least 2% of that wealth in tax each year, raising an estimated 200 to 250 billion dollars annually from around 3,000 people. So far, no country has put this tax into practice.
Alternatives in development finance
Alternatives in development finance
Global South countries have also built new sources of development finance, separate from the World Bank. These alternatives take different forms, and each comes with its own tradeoffs.
New multilateral banks
New multilateral banks
Some Global South countries have created new multilateral banks, rather than only pushing for reform of existing international institutions. These banks are owned and governed by their member countries, which changes who makes lending decisions.
The New Development Bank (NDB) is the clearest example. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, known together as BRICS, established it in 2015. BRICS has coordinated on economic issues since 2009, outside the institutions the Global North dominates. The NDB is its alternative to the World Bank. Its governance differs from the World Bank in two ways: founding members hold equal shares, and loans do not carry the policy conditions typically required by IMF and World Bank lending. NDB membership has since expanded beyond the founding five to include Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, the UAE, Colombia, and Uzbekistan. By the end of 2024, the NDB's total project approvals since its founding in 2015 had reached 39 billion US dollars.
Figure 3. The New Development Bank's headquarters in Shanghai
(Credit: Donnie28, CC BY-SA 4.0)
The NDB still faces real limits. Its funding is still small compared to the World Bank, which alone approved close to 69 billion dollars in 2024, almost double the NDB's total since 2015. The NDB also borrows and lends mainly in US dollars, despite its stated goal of financing in local currencies, and its funding remains concentrated among founding members. Western sanctions on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine also created a dilemma for the bank. Continuing normal lending to a founding member risked the NDB's own credit rating. This is the score that tells lenders how risky it is to lend to a borrower. It also risked the NDB's access to international capital markets. The bank responded by halting new lending to Russia.
China's Belt and Road Initiative
China's Belt and Road Initiative
China provides more development finance to other countries than any other government outside the G7, but it is not the only one. India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia have also expanded their lending to other countries in recent years. China's programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is the largest of these, and works differently from a shared bank. Since 2013, the BRI has funded infrastructure such as ports, railways, and power stations in other countries. China's aims are economic and strategic: access to raw materials, new markets for Chinese companies, and stronger political ties with partner countries. By 2025, around 150 countries had joined, and total Chinese engagement had reached roughly 1.4 trillion US dollars. Rather than a bank with shared ownership, the Chinese state and Chinese companies agree loans and contracts directly with each partner country, one deal at a time. This gives China more control over individual projects than a jointly governed bank allows.
Figure 4. The Belt and Road Initiative and China's international trade.
Note: This map is not an equal-area projection, so the relative sizes of countries are distorted. Areas are increasingly exaggerated with distance from the equator, so countries near the equator (such as those in Africa and South-East Asia) look smaller relative to countries at higher latitudes (such as Russia and Canada) than they really are.
(Credit: Belt and Road Research Platform, LeidenAsiaCentre and Clingendael China Centre)
The BRI has real benefits and real risks. Supporters point out that it fills a genuine gap. Many Global South countries need infrastructure investment that Global North lenders and multilateral banks have not provided at this scale. It has also raised trade and growth in some recipient countries, giving them lending options beyond Western institutions. Critics point to a 2021 dataset of over 13,000 Chinese-financed projects. Chinese loans often carry higher interest rates and shorter repayment periods than loans from OECD countries. Many contracts also require borrowers to route revenue through accounts that Chinese lenders control, giving China priority over other creditors. Some contracts exclude Chinese debt from Paris Club debt restructuring talks (Section 7.3.7). Critics also point to weak environmental and labour standards on some projects, and growing debt distress in countries that already had high debt levels.
Alternatives on debt
Alternatives on debt
Section 7.3.7 described how debt repayments leave many Global South states with little money for public services, and how private lenders and periodic rising US interest rates make this worse. Debt-to-GDP levels in Global South countries are often similar to, or lower than, Global North countries. The real difference between the groups of countries is the cost of borrowing and the difficulty of getting debt relief when it is needed. This section looks at proposals to address both problems.
Multilateral credit rating agencies
Multilateral credit rating agencies
Before a government can borrow on international markets, credit rating agencies decide how risky it is to lend to that country. Three companies, Moody's, S&P Global, and Fitch, issue over 94% of all country credit ratings. A lower rating means a higher risk of default, so lower-rated countries pay higher interest rates.
A country's credit rating depends heavily on its income level, more than on its actual debt burden. One study found that a group of the most heavily indebted low-income countries had junk (very low) ratings, even though their debt-to-GDP ratios were lower than the world's most indebted Global North countries. This creates a reinforcing feedback loop. Lower-income countries receive lower credit ratings partly because they are poorer, not because they are actually less likely to repay. Lower ratings raise borrowing costs. Higher borrowing costs leave less money for the public investment that would raise incomes in the first place (Figure 5).
Figure 5. A reinforcing feedback loop showing the relationship between income, credit ratings, borrowing costs (interest rates), investment and back to impact on incomes.
Part of the reason is that rating agencies rely on subjective judgements about a country's political stability, and less public data is available for many lower-income countries. Media coverage also plays a role. One 2024 study compared media coverage of elections in African countries with coverage of countries outside Africa that had similar political risk levels. It found that African elections received more negative coverage, even when the underlying political risks were similar. The study estimated that this bias could cost African countries billions of US dollars a year in unnecessarily high interest rates on debt.
In response, economists and UN officials have proposed a Multilateral Credit Rating Agency, based at the United Nations. This would be a public alternative that rates countries on long-term development needs rather than short-term market sentiment. A separate initiative is further along. The African Union has developed the African Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA), scheduled to launch in October 2026. It is designed to rate African countries independently of the three dominant credit rating agencies, starting with debt issued in local currencies.
Debt relief
Debt relief
Section 7.3.7 explained why private bondholders, investors such as BlackRock or pension funds that buy a country's debt as tradeable bonds, are harder to bring into debt restructuring talks than governments or the IMF. In 2014, the Group of 77, a coalition of Global South countries, raised this problem at the UN General Assembly. They proposed a binding set of rules that would require all lenders, including private bondholders, to take part in debt restructuring. G7 governments and the European Union (EU) refused to join the negotiations, and no legally-binding rules were ever agreed.
Creditor states coordinate through the Paris Club (Section 7.3.7), but debtors have no equivalent. Some are now trying to build one. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) runs a Borrowers' Platform for coordination among borrowing states, and a UN report proposes turning it into a formal debtors' coalition that negotiates as a group, increasing their collective power.
A different kind of proposal has had more traction. In 2022, Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley (Figure 6) launched the Bridgetown Initiative at the UN Climate Conference COP27. Mottley argued that the global financial system fails climate-vulnerable countries in two ways. Debt repayments leave too little money for public investment, and borrowing money for climate adaptation costs too much.
The Initiative proposed automatic pauses on debt repayments during climate disasters, more IMF emergency funding for Global South countries, and changes to rules that currently limit public investment in vulnerable countries. France, the IMF, and the World Bank supported the idea in principle, and it directly inspired the 2023 Paris Summit for a New Global Financing Pact. One real outcome has been the addition of debt pause clauses to loans from some states and development banks, so repayments stop automatically after a natural disaster. In 2024, an updated version of the Initiative proposed new international taxes on wealth, shipping, aviation, and fossil fuel companies, to help pay for climate finance.
Figure 6. Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley. (Credit: Elliot Vick / FCDO, CC BY 4.0)
Large-scale debt relief has happened before. The London Debt Agreement of 1953 (Figure 7) cancelled about 50% of West Germany's external debt, as part of its post-World War II reconstruction. It brought together states, private banks, and individual creditors into one coordinated agreement, the kind of coordination the 2014 G77 proposal failed to achieve. Several countries now considered part of the Global South, including Sri Lanka, agreed to this cancellation. More recently, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of 1996, and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative of 2005, cancelled debts owed by some of the world's poorest countries to the IMF, World Bank, and other lenders. This history shows that large-scale debt relief is possible, when countries have enough political will to act.
Figure 7. Hermann Josef Abs (lead German negotiator) and other delegates sign the London Debt Agreement, 27 February 1953.
(Credit: Deutsche Bank AG, Kultur und Gesellschaft Historisches Institut, CC BY-SA 3.0)
Some countries may negotiate debt relief directly with their own creditors. A debt-for-nature swap reduces a country's debt in exchange for protecting ecosystems or investing in climate action. Both the debtor country and its creditors must agree to it. In 2021, Belize reduced its debt by about 10% of GDP through a debt-for-nature swap with The Nature Conservancy, agreeing to protect its coral reefs and coastline in return (Figure 8). Section 6.3.8 explains how these swaps work in more detail.
Figure 8. The famous Blue Hole, part of Belize’s marine protected area (MPA).
(Credit: tamifred, licensed from Adobe Stock)
Could the rules of existing institutions change instead?
Could the rules of existing institutions change instead?
Rather than building new institutions, some proposals call for changing the rules of the existing ones. In 2026, the World Inequality Lab published the Global Justice Report, one of the most recent and detailed calls for this kind of reform. Among the Report’s many proposals include changes to how countries vote in international institutions, and which currency the world's financial system runs on.
Figure 9. Chapter 3 of the Global Justice Report outlines proposals for a new democratic international order.
(Credit: Global Justice Project)
Reforming how countries vote
Reforming how countries vote
The IMF currently allocates voting shares mainly by GDP. Major decisions need support from 85% of votes. This means any country holding just over 15% of votes can block a decision alone. The United States holds about 17% of votes, giving it an effective veto.
The Global Justice Report proposes replacing this system with a double majority rule. Budgetary decisions would need approval from 55% of countries, representing 60% of the world's population. This is similar to the voting system used in the Council of the European Union (EU). The report also calls for the end of veto power altogether, including at the UN Security Council.
Reforming the dollar-based system
Reforming the dollar-based system
Most countries borrow and trade in US dollars, even when neither side of the transaction is American (Section 7.3.6). The Global Justice Report proposes replacing this system with a new global currency, managed by a new United Nations Central Bank rather than any single country.
The plan would build on Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), an asset the IMF already issues and discussed in greater detail in Section 6.3.8. Over time, SDRs would evolve into a currency that countries could use directly for trade and lending, instead of the US dollar. The report argues that this would end what it calls the dollar's exorbitant privilege, the extra financial benefit a country gets from issuing the world's main reserve currency. No state has yet adopted this proposal.
Activity 7.4.3
Activity 7.4.3
Concept: Systems, power, regeneration
Skills: Thinking skills (critical thinking, transfer)
Time: 30-40 minutes
Type: Individual, pairs, small group
Identifying a hypothetical country's financial reform options
Read the country profile below:
Country X owes debt to a mix of foreign governments, international institutions, and private bondholders. Last year, a major cyclone destroyed roads and farmland, forcing the government to borrow more money to rebuild. A large foreign-owned mining company operates in the country but pays very little local tax, because profits are recorded in the country where the company has its headquarters. The country has no existing relationship with any regional development bank.
Individually, with a partner, or in a small group, go through each mechanism below. For each one, decide whether it might help this country, and explain why or why not, using evidence from the section. Not every mechanism will apply. Part of the task is deciding which ones might genuinely help this country, and which ones don't.
ATAF-style tax treaties
A coordinated billionaire wealth tax
Joining or borrowing from the New Development Bank
Bridgetown Initiative-style debt pause clauses and SDR reallocation
A London Agreement-style comprehensive debt cancellation
If working with a partner or group, discuss your reasoning together, or write up your answers individually.
Compare your conclusions with another person, pair, or group.
Ideas for longer activities and projects are listed in Subtopic 7.5
Checking for understanding
Checking for understanding
Coming soon!
Further exploration
Further exploration
Debt Justice — the website of the UK-based organisation that campaigns for fairer debt rules, including for low-income countries, with accessible research on debt distress, illicit flows, and restructuring. Difficulty level: easy/medium
Tax competition and the race to the bottom - an article from Tax Justice Network explaining the importance of global cooperation on tax and debunking myths around tax competition. Tax Justice Network has a wealth of other resources related to global tax issues. Difficulty level: easy/medium
African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) — the website of ATAF, with reports and resources on African tax governance, model treaties, and capacity-building work. Difficulty level: medium
UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation — the United Nations website with background on the intergovernmental negotiations on tax cooperation. Difficulty level: medium
Tax Justice Network topic guides — a library of short guides covering the ideas behind global tax reform, including the UN tax convention, wealth taxes, illicit financial flows, and empire and decolonisation. Useful for exploring several of the topics in this section in more depth. Difficulty level: medium.
Global Justice Report — the website of the World Inequality Lab's Global Justice Project, with the full report, research papers, and an interactive tool to explore different reform scenarios. Covers a much wider range of proposals than this section, including a global wealth fund to redistribute resources between countries and a roadmap for full economic convergence by 2100. Difficulty level: medium/hard.
Section 6.3.8, Global strategies: Redesigning global financial tools — a section of the Regenerative Economics textbook covers specific tools for regenerative finance, including various forms of nature-based finance and Special Drawing Rights, the mechanism the Bridgetown Initiative wants reallocated toward lower-income countries. Read this section for a fuller explanation of how SDRs actually work. Difficulty level: medium.
Section 6.3.9, Global strategies: Redesigning global financial rules — a section of the Regenerative Economics textbook that covers further ideas for reforming global financial rules, including a multilateral investment court to replace private investor-state dispute panels, and proposals to close down illicit financial flows and offshore tax havens. Difficulty level: medium.
Sources
Sources
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Terminology
Terminology
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